

A SOCIALIST COMMENTARY ON COLONIAL AFFAIRS

Venture

JOURNAL OF THE FABIAN COLONIAL BUREAU

VOL. 6 No. 10

FEBRUARY, 1955

MONTHLY 6d

Incorporating *Empire*

Comment

SURRENDER TERMS IN KENYA

THE Government of Kenya's surrender offer has come not a moment too soon. The Colony cannot go on much longer with the present appalling slaughter, of which the official figures for one month (December, 1954) provide an example. In that month, 338 terrorists were killed and 119 captured; 2,285 suspects were detained for questioning. Two Europeans and five Africans in the Security Forces were killed and one European and 12 Africans were wounded. One European and 28 African civilians were murdered and one European, one Asian and 23 Africans were wounded. 869 cattle, 585 sheep and 120 goats were stolen. 94 terrorists surrendered. At present there is a mass attack on the forests, while surrendering terrorists are to be detained but not put to death for crimes committed before January 18. If the offer is successful, the detention camps, already holding thousands, will have to take in more prisoners who will presumably ultimately be tried—a process which must take very many months. There is criticism on both wings—from infuriated opponents of Mau Mau who demand that murderers should be hanged, and from those who object to detention without trial. In this case, we have no objection to detention, even for a long period. To send surrendered terrorists back to their localities would merely invite another wave of violence within the Kikuyu tribe. Breaches of the law by both African and Europeans on the Government side have been committed on such a scale as to

indicate that the whole situation has been completely out of hand for months. Most of them have been perpetrated by the 20,000 strong Kikuyu Guard, and C.I.D. enquiries with a view to prosecution have undermined their morale 'even to the extent of risk that sections of the Guard might lay down their arms.'¹ Those in this country who made repeated representations in private, realising that public criticism would wound many men who have undoubtedly tried to maintain justice in Kenya, have consistently been told that the Government was doing all it could. The only conclusion could be that the Kenya Government could not enforce its own orders. At the present time, it should be given all possible support to end the bloodshed, and it is regrettable that once again this is being withheld by many Europeans whose emotions are understandable but whose record of opposition to anything done by Government, good or bad, is evidently to be maintained unbroken even in this extremity.

If surrenders take place on a large scale, the next task will be rehabilitation. The Church Missionary Society has rightly pointed out that this will be necessary not only for ex-terrorists but also for 'those among the forces of law and order (whether African or European) whose misdeeds have been legally expunged by the amnesty.'² But meanwhile there are still thousands in the camps who may or may not have committed punishable offences. Their cases should be dealt with as an urgent matter, particularly since existing methods of 'screening' cannot be relied upon. In the case of trade unionists, for example, many were detained after the *Operation Anvil* clearance of Nairobi. After pressure was brought to bear by the Kenya Federation of Trade Unions, the T.U.C. and I.C.F.T.U., many were re-screened and some released. Yet it is still not certain that they will not be swept up again, and Africans are still said to be in fear of the police and afraid to go to trade

¹ *Kenya Weekly News*, 21.1.55.

² *Kenya—Time for Action!* C.M.S., 6, Salisbury Square, London, E.C.4. 1d.

union meetings. No policy of general betterment can succeed while this atmosphere prevails.

The Kenya Government is obviously making an attempt to pursue a positive policy. It has accepted a large part of the recommendations of the Carpenter Committee on African Wages,¹ notably the aim of stabilisation of labour within its area of employment, and a move away from the 'bachelor' wage system. The Legislative Council has already set up a committee to investigate the possibilities of social security schemes. An investigation into methods of securing African representation in Legislative Council is under way, and must be completed before the next election, since it has already been promised that the existing method of nomination will not be used again. The adoption of the Lidbury Salaries Commission Report, which abolishes racial scales in the civil service, is also an important move forward, although details of the Report are open to criticism.

But basically, Kenya will stand or fall on its land policy. The maintenance of the 'White' Highlands is the root of discontent and will in the long run prove incompatible with the principle of multi-racial government. Protestations from European Ministers that they 'stand by the White Highlands as they are to-day'² arouse less and less sympathy in this country, where even a Conservative Member of Parliament (Mr. Alport) has described the Highlands as 'a political and economic anachronism.' Moreover, they ring progressively less true. The Government itself persuaded the Highlands Board to set aside 16,000 acres in the Ithanga Hills for the Kamba last year, and in December the Legislative Council approved the transfer of 1,000 acres to the Elgeyo-Marakwet African Reserve. We hope that this is a beginning of a retreat from the racial principle towards the establishment of the Highlands as a non-racial 'good farming' area, which could, by change of administrative practice, be achieved under the ægis of a modified Highlands Board. A start has also been made on the implementation of the Swynnerton Plan for African agriculture, for which part of the United Kingdom's gift of £5m. is being utilised, and there is continued improvement in the production of cash crops by Africans (18,806 African coffee growers in 1954 as against 7,148 in 1951, although the acreage is still small). Finally, there is the Agriculture Bill, which, besides dealing with such matters as the price of agricultural produce, empowers the Minister to insist on good farming practices in scheduled areas (which will be in the European areas) and to enforce the proper use of undeveloped land.

Yet such measures can only show long-term results. They provide some guarantee of good faith, but they have yet to be implemented. The immediate need is to demonstrate that at least the bulk of the European community is wholeheartedly behind them, and behind the attempt to end the emergency. Precisely the opposite is at present being demonstrated. If the uproar goes on much longer, it is hard to see how Kenya can have any future at all.

MOTES AND BEAMS

THE influx of Jamaicans into the United Kingdom may perhaps at long last rouse the British people to the realities of the situation in some of the colonial territories. Anyone who is in any doubt about the necessity for understanding should read the colonial press. Not only in the West Indies, but throughout Africa, all kinds of highly coloured reports are being circulated. If Nottingham is doubtful about the employment of coloured bus workers and is unimpressed by their success in Birmingham, a glance at the *East African Standard* may help those responsible to make up their minds. That journal has rightly pointed out (26.11.54) that the influx 'creates very special ethical and political problems in a country which is the head of a great Commonwealth,' and adds:

'Here in East Africa, where the problems of multi-racialism are in the forefront, those who wrestle with them and with the many and delicate issues which arise in the processes of adjustment, and the elimination of the so-called "discriminations" which conflicting and differing forms of society and social habits and standards instinctively impose, will not regret that the British people have now the opportunity of dealing with similar problems in their own life. It is particularly interesting and significant that the first violent reaction should come from the supporters of the Socialist Party whose politicians at all levels have been so eagerly uncompromising in their criticisms and points of view.'

We do not accept the accuracy of the last sentence for one moment, but it should not be swept aside. It is amongst the working class, where there is competition for housing and jobs, that conflict is most likely to arise. There has been great willingness to accept overseas workers, of all colours, since the war, but there have also been some attempts at discrimination, each one of which is reported. Good feeling is not helped by the knowledge that poor Jamaicans are being encouraged to come by exaggerated tales of the British paradise, or that all the Colonies and Dominions put up bars against immigration while Britain does not. Some of the housing cases that have come to public notice arouse real and justifiable anger.

¹ See *Venture*, October, 1954, page 8.

² Mr. Havelock, reported in *The Times*, 24.1.55.

But these were to be expected. We have established standards of social conduct and humane treatment far in advance of those of the Colonies. We have almost forgotten what the really poor look like, and how exploiting landlords can behave. Many people have never known or cared that every fifth Jamaican is out of work. Now we do know, and are called upon to face the practical problems. The solution is not exclusion. Britain has been enabled to take in immigrants without disaster because of the strength of our social system. It is still strong, and must remain liberal. If the problems are new to us, we can look elsewhere. The United States has Fair Employment legislation and long experience of attempted discrimination in housing and other services.¹ The U.S. took in thousands of West Indians before the McCarran legislation diverted them here. The Government, or some of the boroughs that are appealing for help, should study American, and any other relevant experience. For the labour movement, the obvious first job is to prevent discrimination arising in the trade unions, where so far it has been almost absent. Meanwhile, the Colonies are watching.

FEAR

WE publish on page 8 an article which throws some light on the difficulties of arriving at a settlement in Uganda. Many of these arise naturally out of the conditions of the country. Some are induced by external factors. Notable amongst these are the fear of a link with Kenya and the suspicion that industrialisation may bring increased immigration and settler domination 'that would surely force the British Government to abdicate its responsibilities to the Africans.' There is nothing in the record of the Uganda Government to justify this fear, but Baganda may legitimately look abroad. If the colour bar remains entrenched on the Copperbelt, and the Government of Northern Rhodesia powerless to act, how can Africans be expected to accept without misgiving the Governor of Uganda's categorical statement that an industrial colour bar will never be allowed in Uganda? More and more as time goes on the consequences of imposing federation on Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are being revealed. We opposed federation throughout because we saw it as an attempt to abandon United Kingdom responsibility in favour of the local European minorities. We argued that the 'safeguards' would not give Africans sufficient protection. There is no evidence that they are doing so. Nothing has been

done to extend the franchise to Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, or to give them a real share in municipal government, or to make 'partnership' a reality in social life. African political movements are harassed by restrictions on the movement of their leaders, even within the Federation, and the leaders of the Northern Rhodesian African Congress have been gaoled for possession of Communist 'literature.' Meanwhile, the little steps that signify withdrawal of United Kingdom control are being taken. Questions in the House of Commons on matters that fall within the responsibility of the Federal Government are fobbed off in a manner that suggests they should not be tabled; the Members of Executive Council in Northern Rhodesia are to be entitled 'Ministers' in preparation for the day when they become in fact Ministers in a fully responsible Cabinet. The danger has, as usual, been only too clearly revealed by Sir Roy Welensky, who said recently:—

'I don't attach the same significance to Dominion status as some people do. With me, it is not a question of status but of stature. I believe that once we have the stature the formal grant of autonomy could not be refused.

In addition, I deprecate any suggestion being implanted in the minds of the Africans by responsible people that theirs is going to be the deciding say as to whether we obtain autonomy or not.'¹

Precisely. Already the 'stature' of the Federation has been recognised by the invitation to Sir Godfrey Huggins to attend the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in his capacity as Prime Minister of the Federation. More unexpected, and equally disturbing, is the invitation to attend the Afro-Asian Conference, which in Asia has been extended only to countries with independent Governments and in Africa to Egypt, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Liberia, Libya, the Gold Coast and the Federation. It must be reiterated that the Federation is not an independent state, nor must it be allowed to become so until the elements of democracy are at least established. The present policy of abdication is a shameful betrayal which destroys confidence throughout Africa and undermines all attempts to pursue a progressive policy, even in Uganda, whose future as an African state would not otherwise be in doubt.

CORRECTION

In Mr. Sorensen's article, *British Borneo*, in our January number there were two errors. 'North Borneo' in the second line of the penultimate paragraph, and in the first line of the last paragraph, should read 'British Borneo.'

¹ See *The Law and Race Discrimination: Recent Experience in the United States*, by David C. Williams, *Venture*, September, 1954, page 3.

¹ *East African Standard*, 10.12.54.

A SOUTH AFRICAN LOOKS AT WEST AFRICA

The following extracts are taken from an article by Professor D. Hobart Houghton published in Vol. XXI, No. 3, of the 'Race Relations Journal,' journal of the South African Institute of Race Relations. They are published here by kind permission of the author and the editor of the 'Journal.'

EVERY few miles we passed through primitive villages surrounded by bush. They were strikingly different from anything in South Africa, for they were small, closely-knit villages of mud houses roofed with thatch. In each was some market or place of trade, and there were throngs of women traders with wares laid out along the road, selling yams, peppers, plantains and a host of other foods. Almost every village had books displayed for sale. . .

. . . Accra . . . is a modern city of some 136,000 inhabitants, of whom less than 3,000 are non-Africans. The outstanding difference between it and South African towns was the congestion in the streets and the fact that almost everyone one saw in cars, buses, walking, or in shops, was black. . .

Social life in the Gold Coast generally exhibited no sign of any colour bar. There is a marked difference between the standard of living of the Westernized, educated, and sometimes wealthy Africans, and that of their poorer and more primitive fellow-countrymen, particularly those of the interior; but of colour bar between Black and White there was no trace. At nearly all the social events which we attended, Black and White mixed easily. In hotel lounges one would see people of all races, and in dance clubs and social centres such as the Y.M.C.A. there was no discrimination. . .

The University College of the Gold Coast is consciously modelled on Cambridge. . . Provision for undergraduates is almost lavish and considerably better than that at many universities in the United Kingdom or in South Africa; undergraduates are all provided with foam mattresses, a luxury which the writer did not enjoy in his undergraduate days at Oxford! . . . The undergraduates appeared to be keen, intelligent, and fully appreciative of their opportunities. One wondered whether the disparity between their standard of living and that of their less privileged fellows in the towns and rural areas of the Gold Coast was not unduly great. Members of the staff averred that by giving the Africans the best, their standards would be set high, and they would learn to value those things for which the University stood. But one asked oneself whether the aim was not too much to provide an "education for a gentleman" at a time when universities in most Western countries were becoming more democratic in their conception. . . The insistence on high academic standards cannot be too warmly praised, but high thinking has been known to go with less luxurious living.

Looking at the halls of residence, one felt that one was looking at a Cambridge college in West

Africa, and regretted that the University College did not seem to be in some more intimate way a West African growth. . .

One naturally asked what part the study of African languages played in the curriculum, and it was surprising to learn that both in the Gold Coast University and at Ibadan they received little or no attention. When one remembers that at all the white universities in South Africa there are departments for the study of Bantu languages, and that at Fort Hare they constitute a major department, their neglect in West Africa is the more remarkable. . .

The standard of living appeared to vary greatly, from the relatively high standard enjoyed by professional people and the larger cocoa planters to the apparent poverty of so many peasants. Those who own cocoa trees are, generally speaking, fairly well off, some wealthy, but much of the agricultural labour and the work on the mines is undertaken by migrant workers from the north or neighbouring French territories. Their poverty and the social conditions under which they live formed a marked contrast to the prosperity of the middle classes. The disparity between the general development of the south and the Northern Territories appears to be great, and there is danger that the welfare of the interior may not receive due consideration by the political parties whose origin and support is in the south. It has been said of the Union of South Africa that in its large Bantu population it has within its own borders a "colonial problem." One wonders whether the same might not also be said of the Gold Coast.

The general impression of the Gold Coast was of a relatively small country enjoying considerable prosperity and self-consciously moving rapidly towards political independence. Many of the Africans met had something of the spirit of the Crusaders and real patriotism, and a desire to further the progress of their land. On the whole the impression was most encouraging, but enough has been said to illustrate the difficulties and dangers in the path of progress. There is so much to be done and so few qualified men with administrative experience, financial ability, and personal integrity to carry out all the tasks. One understands that there was considerable anti-British feeling a few years ago. Now this seems to be entirely absent and most of the Africans with whom one spoke were fully aware of the need for continued assistance in administration, advice by people from Britain or other more highly developed countries. It was, however, made clear that such people were welcomed as employees of the Gold Coast, but could

never hope to become citizens in an African State. The term "expatriate" is widely used to describe the non-Africans, and one could not help being struck by the difference between this attitude and that of the guide taking us round New York who boasted proudly that America gave such opportunities to immigrants that several Mayors of New York had in fact been foreign born. One hopes that the present attitude in West Africa is merely a temporary phase and that when the people of the Gold Coast feel surer of their independence they will be more prepared to accept foreigners and allow them to enter fully into their social and political life. . .

The night market at Ibadan was perhaps the most picturesque sight we saw in West Africa. Hundreds of traders sit on the ground behind small piles of goods, each lit by a tiny oil lamp. . . . From the Bower Hill in the centre of the immense town one gets a wonderful view and an appreciation of what a huge place it is. But the problem of modernising Ibadan, introducing Western conceptions of hygiene and sanitation, and attempting to eliminate the appalling slums, is one which would make the ablest administrator quail.

Seven miles out of the town is the new University College of Ibadan, and a greater contrast than that between the native city and the new University College it would be hard to find. The architecture of the University is strikingly modern but most impressive. . . In spite of the modern architecture, or perhaps because of it, one felt that the College was somehow indigenous to Africa in a way that one did not feel at the Gold Coast. . . A group of students who came to tea with us discussed contemporary affairs most intelligently and were in every respect the equal of any good group of students one might meet in a British, American, or South African university. They had charming manners and a very real appreciation of Western culture and international affairs. . .

The town of Lagos is of relatively recent growth and essentially a British creation when compared with Ibadan. . . A huge departmental store owned by the United Africa Company was . . . crowded with customers, but in all departments the shop assistants were Africans. In the restaurant of this store one would see large numbers of Africans, some Europeans, some Syrians, all drinking tea or having refreshments. There appeared to be no colour distinction of any sort. One was impressed when meeting Westernized Africans by the friendly, courteous and yet self-confident manner in which they associated with Europeans, and felt that the Nigerian really saw himself as the equal of any man.

Yet Lagos has its slums, and one saw in the backwaters of the town filthy hovels and dirty lanes, housing conditions much worse than anything even in the shantytowns around Johannesburg. Lagos is a modern city in its streets, shops, administrative buildings, harbour, railway station and in its general lighting and sanitation, but its appalling slums indicate a failure on the part of the urban administration to maintain civilised standards throughout the whole of the urban area. The town council has recently been the subject of a report by Mr. Storey. . . The

city recently obtained full-municipal powers under its elected, all-Nigerian council, but troubles and difficulties soon arose. The report by Mr. Storey would be amusing if it were not so tragic, with its picture of an impressive façade in the elegant speeches and high standard of debate in the city council, and its tale of corruption and inefficiency in municipal government. One feels that in this report one has an excellent picture of the problems of the evolution of a modern democratic administration in West Africa. . .

. . . To one who believes that the economic and cultural achievements of North America are in no small measure due to the existence of a single political entity stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Florida to Canada, West African sectionalism was distressing. Apart from the divisions within Nigeria, there was a general provincialism: people in Nigeria were not interested in what was happening in French territory or the Gold Coast. Indeed, Lagos and Accra each seemed nearer to London and New York than to each other. . .

. . . There was a spirit of confidence and optimism, but one could not but wonder whether the difficulties might not prove too great for the realisation of the highest hopes of the better class of West African patriot. . . One feels that a battle for the survival of civilisation is being fought: perhaps it is a triangular contest. In the north there is the civilisation of Islam: old, conservative, and not susceptible to rapid change. In the west and east modern concepts of government and economic standards derived from Europe and America have been adopted by the progressive minority, but the vast mass of the population has been little touched by these things. One wonders who will govern the Nigeria of the future. Will it be the *élite* of the University College of Ibadan, charming, intelligent, progressive men and women of high integrity, or will it be the *demos* from the slums of the city of Ibadan, living in their filth and in a world in which nepotism and corruption are the recognised way of life? There are only 500 students at the University compared with 500,000 people in the town of Ibadan. Which voice will speak for the new Nigeria? . . .

The South African visitor returns home having found West Africa neither the demi-paradise of progress and political enlightenment that some of his countrymen believe it to be, nor the chaos, corruption and black anarchy depicted by others. It is a vast and infinitely exciting human experiment—a tremendous effort by a small intelligentsia of dedicated men, African and British, to raise the masses, to overcome ignorance, prejudice, poverty, and the many natural disabilities of the tropics. It may succeed or fail: it is still too early to pass judgment. One thing is certain: the West African has already demonstrated that he is competent to do many things which the Bantu in South Africa have not even been encouraged to attempt. A District Officer of Nigeria, recently returned from a visit to the Union, commented that there the Europeans do far too much for the Bantu and allow them to do far too little for themselves.

LABOUR'S COLONIAL POLICY

We print below further extracts from answers to the questionnaire circulated to members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, printed in 'Venture' in September, 1954.¹

Question 3 in the political section was:

3. Should we insist on *democratic* self-government before handing over power? (This is a leading question, to which a fairly long answer is desirable, with reference to specific cases, e.g., British Guiana, Uganda, Central Africa).

Question 3.

'In general the answer is "yes." The establishment of democratic government is the only thing which can justify our past acquisition of Colonies, and it would not be sufficient to establish nominally independent dictatorships of the South American type. If there is reason to believe that a dominant party would seek to perpetuate its ascendancy by undemocratic methods (which may have been the case in British Guiana), self-government should be withheld. Power will almost inevitably, in the first instance, be in the hands of a fairly small educated minority (e.g. in India), but this does not matter very much so long as this minority will be expanded by the gradual spread of education. It would be wrong, however, to hand over power to a minority which seeks to maintain its privileged position permanently. This is the danger with white minorities in Africa, and in general self-government should not be given until Africans can be given sufficient political power to prevent this situation arising: e.g. at least parity of representation in the legislative body, or a wide franchise on a common roll.'—(United Kingdom.)

'This is difficult, and I would say not "democratic" but "balanced," in the sense of checks and balances, government should be the objective. I don't think adult suffrage should be a requirement, although the Colonial Office should press for it whenever possible. I think that ministerial government which has been tried for at least the life of one legislature should be required. If we were to insist on democratic standards we would invariably fall out with the colonial politicians. Now that the virus of self-determination is so spread, no colonial leader will agree with the United Kingdom Government, of either party, or an independent expert on when they are ready for self-government. . . Now where you have an attempted coup d'état as in British Guiana, still under a transitional régime, the Colonial Office is justified to interfere, but had Jagan worked the first four years and pulled his tricks after being re-elected, I think that it would not have been justified. . . '—(Bahamas.)

'Where the lack of democracy stems from the presence of a minority of settlers, we are liable to find ourselves faced with a *fait accompli*. In Central Africa, we can probably no longer assert our authority to any great extent; indeed, as in international politics generally, better results may be obtainable by negotiation. However, where we do still have authority, we must not lightly abandon it to settler minorities. Where democracy is endangered by the growth of communism, the problem is extremely difficult. Even if one knew the whole truth about British Guiana, the political and moral problem involved would baffle. The answer is that advance towards self-government must be preceded not only by political education (which tends to mean propaganda), but also by economic and social measures which are calculated to begin wiping out the memory of earlier injustices and inequalities. The deeper question of principle, namely whether, in the post-war world, we can allow countries over which we retain political control to go communist if they ultimately insist on doing so, is too difficult for discussion here. I personally am not afraid to admit that I cannot answer it.'—(United Kingdom.)

'It is often being argued that democracy is devoid of practical meaning in a society where the majority of the people cannot read or write. I think, personally, that democracy has a deeper basic significance. We have had unmistakable instances of absolute totalitarianism as well as enlightened social democracy in the West, and it is important to bear all this in mind while judging colonial people in this context. A truly benevolent bureaucracy is possible, so long as the sanctions behind it rest with an enlightened and liberal democracy such as in the United Kingdom. But handing over power means transferring these sanctions to a source within the geographical boundaries, and if self-government is granted without a truly democratic structure there is a grave danger of creating anti-labour forces. In the case of multi-racial societies such as in East Africa, there may be further difficulties in such an event. It is easy to visualise in what way self-government will be short of true democracy in these areas if power is handed over to a government based on racial parity, etc. Can it be seriously said that such government will remain tenable indefinitely? In Uganda, the rest of the country ought not to be considered separately from Buganda. The Lukiko no less than the rest of the country will have to provide a democratic structure, and if this becomes possible, relations between a central government and the various provinces can be defined without great difficulty. The important thing at present is to encourage the greatest possible harmony between Buganda and the rest of the country. Today, it may seem an unduly apprehensive view. To-morrow it may be a difficult problem.'—(Tanganyika.)

' . . . A guardian cannot hold back his ward for

¹ See *Venture*, October, November and December, 1954, and January, 1955, for articles by John Hatch and extracts.

ever. . . And if he chooses a form of government that the guardian doesn't like, has the guardian really any basic right to ban that government—to suspend the constitution, for example, as in British Guiana? . . . I saw the crowds waiting for the return of Jagan and Burnham to British Guiana. For something like 12 to 15 miles out of Georgetown there were groups of people waiting outside their houses—in some cases the whole village seemed to be out of doors. Most groups wore something red—a red flower, scarf or skirt or even had a red or P.P.P. flag. In the evening . . . there was a mass demonstration on bicycles in Georgetown for Jagan and Burnham and the capital was full of their supporters. There is little doubt that if there were an election to-day the P.P.P. would go back as the Government. . .—(United Kingdom.)

‘I would prefer to insist on democratic institutions, not necessarily including ballot-box elections, though since that is current practice it might as well go on. The thing needed is a “self”; i.e. the habit of social organisation in daily life. The essence of democracy is distribution of power; the vote is only a way of distribution, and may be ineffective. The following may illustrate what I mean by “democratic institutions” :—

- (a) a national militia. . . (b) local courts, with justice administered by a bench of local J.P.s, advised by a qualified lawyer, and sitting with the maximum of publicity; the Bench to have representatives of all races and vernaculars, so that any person charged could state his case to a magistrate who understood his language and his culture, and probably knew something about his practical way of life and difficulties as one of the neighbourhood;
- (c) local education authorities. . .

Numerous other similar developments of democracy in daily life are possible, and together provide the basis for national democracy, otherwise at the mercy of demagogues and nincompoops. . .—(Singapore.)

‘The reality of self-government matters more than the form. Persia and Guatemala have demonstrated that the government of a largely foreign-owned “independent” nation governs in the last resort only by courtesy of the foreign owners. So long as it accepts as its first duty the task of safeguarding the property of the foreign owners, it can exercise considerable freedom of action in other matters. Otherwise . . . ! British Guiana is a text-book case of the process of educating the inhabitants of a Colony proceeding to formal self-government in the reality of this unexpressed limitation on its sovereignty. . .—(United Kingdom.)

‘Yes, we should insist on a form of democratic self-government before handing over power. That means democratic government evolved from the lower councils of local government, and not a ready-made pattern imported and imposed at the higher level in the hope that it might grow downwards.’—(Kenya.)

‘It is very doubtful whether our simple two-party system can immediately be adopted without the series of checks and balances and broad acceptance of political philosophy which exists in Britain. It may well be that some form of proportional representation

is better designed to produce healthy democracy in colonial societies. . . In the multi-racial societies . . . before any further power is handed over we should insist on the drawing up of written constitutions guaranteeing basic democratic rights to all inhabitants. An “African State” in Uganda should no more mean the loss of democratic rights to Europeans and Asians than should Central African Federation have meant loss of such rights to Africans.’—(United Kingdom.)

‘. . . If the question is whether we should be assured that the people will always use wisely the power given to them, and never vote for leaders who would not respect the rights of minority groups to oppose and to seek to become the majority, then the answer is more in doubt. In the last resort, a sovereign people must have the right to . . . opt to live under a dictatorship or an oligarchy. Naturally it is to be hoped that this will not occur, and it is legitimate that the granting of full sovereignty should be delayed longer than the most militant nationalist would wish in order that the danger may be reduced. A people need not be literate before they can be entrusted with their own destiny, but they should at least not be without any political experience.’—(United Kingdom.)

‘In a way our willingness to hand over power without any final guarantee of democratic self-government—and no guarantee can ever be final—is the touchstone by which others will judge the extent to which we ourselves adhere to our ostensibly democratic principles. . . We must accept the fact that the first (and perhaps the second) government elected in any Colony is not unlikely to be composed mainly of men who are incompetent (either through inexperience or lack of ability), irresponsible (because the irresponsible appeals more to a gullible electorate, and an inexperienced electorate is almost bound to be gullible), and often corrupt (because they may tend to put their personal political advancement before considerations of sound policy). This is an over-statement, but it is partly true. No doubt such governments will cause us much anxiety, and interfere with policies we should have liked to see implemented, but I think we should exercise forbearance, not out of condonation, but because the only way an electorate can learn is by its mistakes. . . If the government acts *ultra vires*, then, and only then, should we consider the possibility of invoking special reserved powers. . . I think we should ensure that as much democracy as possible is “built into” the system before power is handed over.’—(United Kingdom.)

‘. . . There is a general movement towards independence and a growing irritation at the reluctance of the British to allow the Malayan to run his own affairs. The desire for independence has nothing to do with democracy; nor ultimately is it very concerned with a socialist bad conscience in the metropolitan country. It is much more a matter of resentment that democracy should be imposed from outside. . . It rests with political opinion not to decide whether there should be the granting of independence, but when the transfer is to take place. In Malaya, the answer to this should be: as soon as possible. There is now,

for the first time since the Communists took to the jungle, a strong and well-organised political force in the country: the UMNO-MCA Alliance. This Alliance is not as democratic in ideas as it might be, but it is probably at the moment the most representative body of Malayan opinion. It would be foolish to wait until the model democratic state came along, for it is unlikely that the day would ever come. . . Ultimately, the form of government is not important. If Malaya, with its present background and experience, wishes to become democratic, then it will eventually achieve that aim—and the child of adversity might be the stronger child. But if Malaya is not ultimately interested in democracy, then it will take more than a paper constitution to preserve the democratic spirit.’—(Singapore.)

‘. . . In some ways it is good for a nation to feel it has broken away itself rather than been presented with self-government. The most disastrous policy is to hold on to power too long.’—(United Kingdom.)

‘J. S. Mill in his Essay said: “Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.” Which means, presumably, that the working of a democracy requires not only universal (adult) suffrage, but an educated responsible adult electorate. Formal education, however, is not what is meant; democracy can work and be worked by people who

have had little of that. . . The other qualification, responsibility, can never be taught, it must always be learned. These qualities so necessary to the success of democracy can never be measured—they must always be taken on trust. To that extent the granting of more liberal institutions is always an act of faith. But in British Guiana we went back on it. Why? Because the party that won the first popular election was seeking absolute power unfettered by minority guarantees, had no use for a democratic constitution after it had served its purpose and was bent on destroying it. Interference by the United Kingdom Government (even to the extent, I think, of withdrawing the new constitution) was justified on the ground that in working out our moral “trust” to the colonial peoples we must balance two principles—that of advancement to self-government with that of the preservation of democratic institutions. . . We must never be satisfied to let the electors choose between white imperialism and black dictatorship. In the “plural societies” further difficulties remain to be surmounted. . . If our aim is a multi-racial state . . . Colonial Office control must remain (*i.e.* self-government must be delayed) not until there is a full multi-racial democracy, but at least until such a form of government is in the process of evolution and non-Europeans are actively engaged in the government on behalf of non-European voters and the common aim is recognised. A declaration of such aims should be unequivocally made by a Labour Government.’—(United Kingdom.)

THE NAMIREMBE PROPOSALS

by Abu Mayanja

THE chief arguments employed by the apologists of the Hancock Constitutional Plan for Buganda and Uganda¹ are that it transforms the autocratic Kabaka into a constitutional monarch, and makes provision for an important advance towards representative and responsible self-government in a United Uganda. A closer examination of the proposals, however, reveals that they do nothing of the kind. On the one hand they tend, in effect, to destroy monarchy itself, on the other they evade the question of establishing truly representative and responsible institutions for the whole Protectorate.

The essence of the English Constitution, which is the example, *par excellence*, of a constitutional monarchy, is that the Queen cannot *for long* govern England without the advice, consent and assistance of Parliament; the essence of the Hancock Proposals, in so far as they affect Buganda, is that the Kabaka cannot govern *at all*. Preoccupied with the question of turning the Kabaka into an impotent cypher the

framers of the proposals have overlooked the fact that they cannot create a monarchy, and have, in consequence, made an explicit onslaught on the mystical reverence, the religious allegiance, and all the emotional significance of monarchy which are essential to its existence. They explicitly abolish the royal prerogative in the appointment of Ministers and other important officers of the Buganda Government so that not even a fool, reading their document, could entertain the illusion—most useful to a constitutional monarch, certainly to the English Government—that the Government of Buganda is the Kabaka’s Government. They go even to the extent of destroying the concept of the Kabaka as the father of his people by laying it down that ‘every Kabaka shall henceforward on becoming Kabaka enter into a Solemn Engagement . . . undertaking not to prejudice the security and welfare of his people and the Protectorate.’ At the same time, they make provision—explicitly stated—whereby powers hitherto supposed to be exercised by the Kabaka are transferred to the Governor.

The most disturbing feature of this whole aspect is that it was unnecessary to go to this extreme length. Although the Lukiko had been made more elective,

¹ *Uganda Protectorate: Buganda*. Cmd. 9320, H.M. Stationery Office, 1s. See *Venture*, January, 1955, for comment by Mrs. Eirene White, M.P., on the proposals.

there was no question, in the present crisis, of the Kabaka getting into conflict with it. All that was necessary to transform an existing monarchy into a constitutional one was simply to make the Legislature (the Lukiko) as democratic and as representative as possible, to endow it with exclusive control over the raising and expenditure of the national revenue and over legislation, and also to give it ultimate powers of unseating Ministers who cease to enjoy its confidence. The initiative in the formation of Government would remain the prerogative of the Kabaka, who, however, would find that he could not govern in the face of a hostile Lukiko, and would thereby be forced to appoint such Ministers as commanded its confidence. As it is, although everything has been done to strip the Kabaka of all semblance of authority, it is by no means clear that the Lukiko is the happy inheritor of the royal authority—for its powers over legislation, finance and the control of Ministers are uncertainly shared by the Governor, the Speaker and a Public Service Commission.

It is, therefore, a great relief to learn that, although the return of the Kabaka has been tacked as a bait on the Hancock Report, the Lukiko has asserted its greater wisdom and declined to swallow the Report as a whole; it is more encouraging to learn that the Governor of Uganda has wisely agreed to be present at the meetings of a new committee appointed by the Lukiko to review, and, if necessary, revise, the Namirembe Recommendations.

The Hancock Proposals, in so far as they concern the central Government of Uganda, utterly fail to provide an answer to the vital questions which have profoundly disturbed the public mind in Uganda. These can be summarised in one word—FEAR—the fear, that is, that the African character of Uganda is being steadily undermined, whether through an East African Federation, or through the influx of immigrant population, capital and enterprise consequent upon the industrialisation of the country—an influx that would surely force the British Government to abdicate its responsibilities to the Africans, in favour of the immigrants, as it did in South Africa, Central Africa and Kenya.

Settler domination, perhaps enslavement, would, in the view of the Africans, be consummated in the Uganda Legislative Council. Hence the Baganda's determination, unless present tendencies were stopped, to keep their country outside the purview of the Legislative Council. Hence, too, the attempt to advocate a loose form of central Government—a federation—which would, should the worst come to the worst, leave them some say in their local affairs. It is an entirely defensive measure, not the result of a desire for separatism as an ideal. I, for one, would not countenance the idea of a loose federal government for Uganda unless it were the last resort whereby the Africans would retain some say in their country's destiny.

This fear could have been positively and dynamically met by widening the franchise, rationalising the system of election and enlarging the elected section of the Legislative Council so that the voice of the

people's representatives would be made dominant. Alternatively, negative constitutional checks could have been provided to make it impossible for the immigrant communities to establish a domination. Neither is done.

Of the 61 members of the Legislative Council, only the five members from Buganda could be called 'representative'—though even these would be elected by the Lukiko which is, itself, far from being purely elective.¹ The other 13 of the 18 so-called representative African members would have to be finally appointed by the Governor from lists of names submitted by District Councils, which are even more undemocratic—being at the mercy of the British District Commissioners—than the Lukiko itself. Much has been made of the fact that there will be a total of 30 Africans in a Council of 61 members, but anyone who takes this at its face value misses the whole point of colonial politics. The device of 'packing' a legislature with stooges is fully appreciated and utilised as much by colonial Governors as it was by English Kings, and that is why they don't agree to the free election of the African members. The same is true of the three African 'ministers' who would be appointed in the absolute discretion of the Governor. In brief, the total effect is to widen the field of the Governor's patronage.

By refusing to define citizenship for Uganda, by leaving the urban areas outside the pale of the African local governments (as nuclei for future states within states), by, in a word, leaving Uganda a country of two nations, the Hancock recommendations fail also to provide a negative answer to the Africans' fear about the future of their country. In the meantime, the Lyttelton assurances about East African federation, on which the Hancock Committee based their recommendation that Buganda should participate in the Legislative Council, have been exposed in a speech, which has not been officially contradicted, by Sir Philip Mitchell, ex-Governor of Kenya. Speaking in America he referred to the East Africa High Commission (created by the Labour Government) as a federal authority,' although, he explained, 'there is an agreeable human understanding . . . not to say so aloud.' If the Lyttelton pledge is a mere blind, where do the Hancock recommendations stand?

I have deliberately refrained from a discussion of the passionate desire for independence which pervades my people, because this would have involved me in the hopeless question of whether or not the people of Uganda are fit for self-government, but the Hancock Report is bitterly disappointing to those who had vainly sought in it an avenue to independence.

EDITOR'S NOTE. The Namirembe Conference proposals were agreed and signed by the members of the Buganda Constitutional Committee appointed by the Lukiko. Professor Hancock made no separate proposals of his own.

¹ For details of the composition of the Lukiko see *Venture*, April, 1953, pages 2 and 12.

² *The Times*, 2.11.54.

Parliament

Over-population in Barbados. In reply to Mr. Reid, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the Joint Committee of the Legislature set up to consider over-population had recommended the improvement of the economy of the island, the encouragement of emigration, and the institution by Government of family planning clinics. (October 27.)

Famine Conditions in Tanganyika. In reply to Mrs. Eirene White, Mr. Hopkinson said that near famine conditions still prevailed in certain parts of the Central Province following poor rainfall in two consecutive years. Food supplies in the territory generally were adequate, and the Government had the situation well in hand. UNICEF had generously given 1,200 tons of dried milk for women, children and old people in the area. (November 17.)

Fourah Bay College, Sierra Leone. Mr. Sorensen asked what action had been taken in respect of the Boston Commission Inquiry into the administration of the College and whether the Colonial Development and Welfare Grant would be continued. Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that the Sierra Leone Government was satisfied that the College had made proper arrangements to remedy former shortcomings in its financial administration and it would continue to receive a C.D. and W. grant. (November 24.)

Proposed Increase of School Fees in Malaya. In answer to questions by Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Thomson, Mr. Hopkinson said that a local committee had recommended increases in English secondary school fees; the majority suggested increases rising from 200 per cent. in the lowest forms to 400 per cent. in the highest; the minority suggested increases of 60 per cent. to 200 per cent. This represented a rise of £1 3s. 4d. a month to £2 6s. 8d. or 7s. a month to £1 3s. 4d. The Report was now under consideration and would be debated by the Legislative Council. (November 17 and 24.)

Bechuanaland—Bamangwato College and technical education. In reply to Mr. Paget, Mr. Dodds-Parker said that a proposal to build a technical education block from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds was at present under discussion with the Native Authority of the tribe to which the College belonged. (Dec. 16.)

Co-operative organisations in the Colonial Empire. In reply to Mr. W. T. Williams, Mr. Hopkinson said that at the end of 1953 there were 7,534 registered co-operative organisations compared with 3,926 in 1950. (Dec. 15.)

Wages of workers on tea plantations in East Africa. In reply to Mr. Russell, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that present wages for unskilled labour on tea estates showed increases for Tanganyika and Kenya

of 128 per cent. and 60 per cent. respectively over 1947 figures, and for Uganda of 115 per cent. over 1949 figures. The monthly value of free food provided for unskilled labour on tea estates was calculated at 23s. in Kenya and Tanganyika and 15s. in Uganda. This represented increases for Kenya and Tanganyika of 130 per cent. over 1947 figures and for Uganda of 50 per cent. over 1949 figures. In addition to free housing, which was provided in all three territories, the Kenya tea industry supplied welfare facilities, clinics and schools. (Dec. 15 and 17.)

Kenya. Rehabilitation of Kikuyu women. Mr. Alport asked what policy was proposed by the Government of Kenya for the rehabilitation of Kikuyu women implicated in the Mau Mau movement. Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the work of rehabilitation was already in progress in the camp for women at Kamiti. Other measures would include resettlement of released detainees with their families in guarded villages, the return of some families to employment on farms, and the setting up of an experimental camp for girl supporters of Mau Mau. Women's clubs were organised by the Ministry of Community Development and were meeting with some success in drawing women away from Mau Mau. The Red Cross and the missions were co-operating in this work which was financed from emergency funds. (Dec. 15.)

Racial Equality in African Territories. Mr. Henderson asked the Prime Minister whether he would state the policy of Her Majesty's Government with regard to racial equality in all African territories for which Her Majesty's Government was responsible. The Prime Minister replied that it had often been stated that the aim of our policy in Africa was the advancement in honourable partnership of all communities without discrimination on grounds of race. (Dec. 14.)

African education in N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In reply to Mr. Brockway, Mr. Hopkinson said that every effort was being made to improve the education of African children in both territories. It was true that, at the moment, it was somewhat behindhand, but the additional finance made available through the Federation would help to improve the educational standards. Mr. Johnson asked whether the Minister would agree that it appeared a mockery to many people, white and coloured, in Central Africa, to sponsor a multi-racial University at Salisbury, and have such high standards there, and yet to have such a low standard of secondary education. Would he do something about it urgently. Mr. Hopkinson added that in N. Rhodesia the expenditure on African education had been raised from £745,000 in 1953, to £1,163,000 in 1954. That was an increase of 50 per cent. There had been a similar increase in Nyasaland. (Dec. 15.)

Guide to Books

People of the City

By Cyprian Ekwensi. (Andrew Dakers Ltd., 10s. 6d.)

This book marks a milestone in African literature, for it is the first novel in the modern style that has been published in England by a West African. It cannot, for instance, be compared with the mystical works of Amos Tutuola, which have an enthralled but limited English public.

Cyprian Ekwensi has wisely chosen for his first novel the setting which he knows best. In fact his description of his hero Amusa Sango and his life in Lagos might well be autobiographical, although he assures this reviewer to the contrary. Any European who has seen the teeming multitudes in the Lagos streets must ask himself what sort of private lives these people lead? Where do they live? What happens to them at night when the streets are comparatively empty? The book answers these questions in an amazingly vivid way. The reader is taken off the streets, down dark alleys, into the cool shade of cement floored rooms, and into the dark and squalid tenements where sleeping bodies lie thickly together on a mat strewn floor. One meets love, hatred, mass cruelty, fat sly crooks and suave spivs, in the midst of a seething frantic struggle for a job, or a better job, and above all for a roof over one's head. For this writer pulls no punches. Almost fanatically he tells the truth as he sees it, and it is not altogether a pretty picture that results. There are some Africans who may dislike to see published the less desirable aspects of life in a large African city, but no one who values the truth in reporting can fail to appreciate the sincerity of this book, or to see that the good things that the writer describes are thus made equally believable. Nor does Mr. Ekwensi make his black too black or his white too white, a pitfall which traps many a more experienced novelist. The landlord, Lajide, unpleasant grasping old man that he is, manages to inspire amused affection, and sympathy when he gets his deserts in the end.

The book brings out with some force the lack of European contacts in the real Lagos. There seems no room for them in the busy struggle. Only one, Grunnings, appears in the story. He is married to an African girl according to native law and custom, and has three children by her in spite of a legal wife and children in England. The girl, Beatrice, is a vivid and pathetic character, a country girl, seeking the 'High Life' of the city, and finding only humiliation and a pauper's grave. As a newspaper reporter, the hero of the book comes up against much of the violence and brutality of the city, and some of the descriptions are terrifying. The drumming orgies of the 'Ufemfe' Society take one into that mysterious world of superstition when a woman's death could be due to occlusion of the coronary arteries as the doctor reports, or a sacrifice to some malignant deity. There is humour too in the description of the smooth

dandy Bayo, with his vivid ties, nylon ankle socks, basket shoes and permed hair, who nearly involves Sango in the penicillin racket.

Never once does the reader lose sight of the restless search for betterment; from the country to the towns, and from there to the next Mecca, the Gold Coast. We leave our hero jobless, penniless and homeless, but fortified by a new and what seems to be true love, on the eve of his departure for this 'land of hope.' 'We have our homeland here' says Sango, 'and we must come back when we can answer your father's challenge! . . . When we have DONE something, BECOME something!'

People of the City may have some of the constructional faults of first novels, but it has an integrity which lifts it far above the average work of fiction.

Mercedes Mackay.

Changing Melanesia.

By Cyril S. Belshaw. (Oxford University Press, 17s. 6d.)

This is an ambitious book. It seeks to propound a theory of the process of social change in very simple societies, of which Melanesia provides the examples, by the application to the process of some of the concepts of theoretical economics, notably that of the preference schedule; and further, to show how this theory can be applied in action.

Readers who demand policies and blue prints from social scientists may feel that Dr. Belshaw hardly goes further, despite his claim, than the anthropologists who consider that their scope must be limited to explaining the causes of resistance to innovations whose technical advantages seem self-evident. The principle which administrators are advised to note is that 'Melanesians will accept ends only in so far as they enter their perceptions, are understood by them, and which [*sic*] do not involve a conflict in terms of the various social pressures brought to bear upon them.' Hence, the introduction of new practices must be preceded and accompanied by propaganda, and more extensive and better education must develop a receptive attitude towards them. A means must be found of demonstrating the germ theory of disease by 'concrete representation.' Political officers must show that democratic methods 'do in fact contribute to native happiness'; the holding of mock courts appears to be recommended as a means of doing so. When the desire is expressed for new technical devices such as launches, governments must be prepared to meet it, and not wait until interest has waned or impatience led to political demonstrations. Traditional forms of co-operation must be utilised for cash production.

The book includes a history of the changes through which various Melanesian societies have passed since their first contact with explorers, traders, missionaries

and blackbirders; in this, the economic factors are more explicitly stressed than is usual in such accounts.

Lucy Mair.

Civilisations, Vol. IV (1954) No. 3 (International Institute of Differing Civilisations, 75 Belgian francs). A periodical in English and French, with articles ranging from a survey of soil conservation and proper

land use to a consideration of the aboriginal tribes of India; from the immediate problems of North Africa with a rapidly growing population and changing civilisation, and the particular problem of emigration to metropolitan France (Renaults in the Paris region alone employs over 3,000 of the 300,000 Algerians there), to the Labour Code of the almost unknown Spanish possessions in Africa.

CENTRAL AFRICA SINCE FEDERATION

Mrs. Eirene White, M.P. and Lord Lucan, who visited Kenya and Central Africa, gave their impressions to a meeting of members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau on November 17th, 1954. Some points from their talks are given below.

Mrs. Eirene White :

'In the Rhodesias I heard constant complaints of the complication and expense of Federal machinery, with the three Governors and a Governor-General and separate Federal and Territorial Civil Services. Undoubtedly behind these complaints there is in Southern Rhodesia the view that amalgamation rather than federation of the three Territories is desirable, and this might become within the next few years a demand for brushing aside federation.

One of the main arguments for federation was that economic development would be hastened. In the Federal Parliament Members have to vote federally and some of the economic plans are on a fairly ambitious scale. Both Northern and Southern Rhodesian Members complain at the excessive expense of supporting Nyasaland, and it is true that Nyasaland is benefiting economically—e.g., Zomba Hospital now finds itself able for the first time to afford an adequate nursing staff. But the need of Nyasaland is great, and the Shire River Scheme for hydro-electric development and irrigation and flood control should not be held back. There is an acute land problem, but this is confined to a small area. I wondered whether the political aspirations of the Nyasaland Africans would not outrun their economic and educational development, and also their powers of organisation. If development is not speeded up in Nyasaland, there might be a political explosion, especially if the Africans are unduly irritated by any action of the Federal administration.'

Lord Lucan :

'I also had the impression that it is the intention of the Rhodesian Europeans to press for the abandonment of the federal structure when the time for constitutional change arrives. In my view, Federation is turning out exactly as we had feared it would. Power is in the hands of the Rhodesian Europeans, and the younger generation, many of whom have been educated in the Union and have never been to Europe, are probably less liberal than their parents. There are some liberally-minded Southern Rhodesians, but not many.

I saw two very hopeful developments in Nyasaland and in Barotseland. In Nyasaland, in the extreme north of the territory, the pleasantest sight I saw in Africa was a co-operative union formed of four rice producers' societies. They had had one or two good seasons and were very flourishing. A new rice mill was being installed, and tractors were hired out to members on a contract basis. All committee members and the secretary-manager of the union were Africans, and a Pakistani engineer had been engaged for the rice mill.

Barotseland provided an extraordinary contrast. The territory is extremely backward, but a start has been made on community development. I visited one community development centre, where there were courses of all kinds in crafts, agriculture, health, etc., for village leaders and for extension workers who would go from village to village.

In general, I came to the conclusion that in territories of this kind, where some areas and peoples are so backward, the Colonial Office must in no circumstances allow its control to be diminished, and we must bear this in mind when the Federal Constitution comes up for discussion.'

CONTENTS OF THIS NUMBER

<i>For Reference</i>	<i>February, 1955</i>
<i>Comment</i>	
Surrender Terms in Kenya - - - - -	1
Motes and Beams - - - - -	2
Fear - - - - -	3
A South African Looks at West Africa by <i>D. Hobart Houghton</i> - - - - -	4
Labour's Colonial Policy - - - - -	6
The Namirembe Proposals by <i>Abu Mayanja</i> - - - - -	8
Parliament - - - - -	10
Guide to Books - - - - -	11
Central Africa Since Federation - - - - -	12

FABIAN COLONIAL BUREAU

11 Dartmouth Street, London, SW1

Annual Subscription to Bureau . . 20s.
(including Venture)

Full-time Students' Subscription . 10s.

Annual Subscription to Venture only 7/6d.

Further details of membership from the Secretary